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M
ost empirical studies of the rational expectations hypothesis of the
term structure (REHTS) generally ﬁnd that the data offer little sup-
port for the theory.1 In many cases this large body of empirical
work indicates that the theory does not even provide a close approximation of
market behavior. This feature has led some investigators to search for alterna-
tive “irrational” theories of behavior in order to explain the data. We, on the
other hand, believe that the rejections are so striking that the large amount of
irrationality implied by the data is too implausible for this avenue to be treated
seriously. Since the rejection of rational expectations in these studies generally
involves the rejection of more complicated joint hypotheses, we choose to focus
our energies on exploring a broader class of models that are consistent with
REHTS.
In particular, we examine a model that incorporates Federal Reserve be-
havior along with a reasonable parameterization of term premia to revise the
theory. The consideration of Fed behavior was ﬁrst suggested by Mankiw and
Miron (1986), who found that REHTS was more consistent with the data prior
to the founding of the Fed. Even stronger evidence is presented in Choi and
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Wohar (1991), who cannot reject REHTS over the sample period of 1910–
14. Cook and Hahn (1990) and Goodfriend (1991) argue persuasively that the
Federal Reserve’s use of a funds rate instrument, and, in particular, the way in
which that instrument is employed, is partly responsible for the apparent failure
of REHTS.
Recently Rudebusch (1994), in a study very much in the spirit of ours, pro-
vides some empirical support for the Cook and Hahn (1990) and Goodfriend
(1991) hypothesis. Further, McCallum (1994) shows the theoretical linkage
between the Fed’s policy rule and the regression estimates in various tests of
REHTS when the Fed responds to the behavior of longer-term interest rates.
While Fed behavior represents a potentially important component for ex-
plaining the empirical results of tests of REHTS, any explanation of these
results that also maintains rational expectations must include time-varying term
premia. Without time-varying term premia, tests of REHTS will not be rejected.
This fact is pointed out in Mankiw and Miron (1986) and Campbell and Shiller
(1991). Further, Campbell and Shiller indicate that white-noise term premia are
insufﬁcient to reconcile theory with data. We ﬁnd this to be the case as well.
Thus, we examine a more elaborate model of term premia coupled with Fed
behavior in an attempt to explain some of the empirical results on REHTS.
Before developing a theory of Fed behavior and linking it to empirical
work on REHTS, we present, in Section 1, a brief overview of the rational
expectations hypothesis of the term structure. Then, in Section 2, we construct
a model of Fed behavior that emodies the key elements described in Goodfriend
(1991). We use the resulting model along with REHTS to generate returns on
bonds of maturities ranging from one to six months. In Section 3 we focus,
in essence, on the empirical regularities documented by Roberds, Runkle, and
Whiteman (1993). We show that Fed behavior is not enough to reproduce their
ﬁndings. Then, in Section 4, we turn our attention to incorporating a more
realistic behavior of term premia. Combining these term premia with rational
investor and Fed behavior generates data that is roughly consistent with the
Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman results. Section 5 concludes.
1. THE RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS THEORY OF
THE TERM STRUCTURE
Tests and descriptions of the rational expectations theory of the term structure
constitute a voluminous literature. An excellent survey can be found in Cook
and Hahn (1990), and an exhaustive treatment is contained in Campbell and
Shiller (1991). The basic idea is that with the exception of a term premium,
there should be no expected difference in the returns from holding a long-term
bond or rolling over a sequence of short-term bonds. As a result, the long-
term interest rate should be an average of future expected short-term interest          
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rates plus a term premium. Speciﬁcally, the interest rate on a long-term bond






Etrt+mi(m) + φt(n,m), (1)
where rt+mi(m)i st h em period bond rate at date t + mi, Et is the conditonal
expectations operator over time t information, and φt(n,m) is the term premia
between the n and m period bonds.2 In equation (1), k = n/m and is restricted
to be an integer.
The rational expectations hypothesis implies that rt+mi(m) = Etrt+mi(m) +
et+mi(m), where et+mi(m) has mean zero and is uncorrelated with time t in-












et+mi(m)−[φt(n,m)−α] and α is the non-time-varying
part of the term premium. Thus, future interest rate differentials on the shorter-
term bond are related to the current interest rate spread between the long- and
short-term bond.
Equation (2) forms the basis of the tests of the term structure that we focus





[rt+mi(m) − rt(m)] = α + β[rt(n) − rt(m)] + vt(n,m) (3)
and testing if β = 1. We shall focus our attention on n = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6
months and m = 1 and 3 months. For m = 3 and n = 6 (implying k = 2), the
appropriate regression would be
1/2 [rt+3(3) − rt(3)] = α + β[rt(6) − rt(3)] + vt(6,3). (3 )
That is, the change in the three-month interest rate three months from now
should be reﬂected in the difference between the current six-month and three-
month rates because the pricing of the six-month bill should reﬂect any expected
future changes in the rate paid on the three-month bill.
In the absence of time-varying term premia, the coefﬁcient β should equal
one. In practice, however, that has not been the case. For example, Table 1
2 Term premia arise naturally in consumption-based asset pricing models and involve the
covariance of terms containing the ratio of future price-deﬂated expected marginal utilities of
consumption to the current price-deﬂated marginal utility of consumption, the price of the long-
term bond, and future prices of the short-term bond. See Labadie (1994).            
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reports some estimates obtained by Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman (1993)
and Campbell and Shiller (1991). Not only is β<1, but the degree to which
β deviates from one increases as k increases. Also, the coefﬁcient in the regres-
sion when n = 6 and m = 3 is of the wrong sign and insigniﬁcantly different
from zero.
This latter result is in stark contrast to estimates obtained by Mankiw and
Miron (1986) and Choi and Wohar (1991), who ﬁnd that prior to the advent
of the Fed, the theory fared much better. These two sets of results, which
primarily involve r(6) − r(3), imply a number of possibilities among which
are the following: (1) REHTS once held but no longer does (perhaps because
investors have become irrational), (2) the nature of term premia has changed, or
(3) Federal Reserve policy has in some way affected the nature of the empirical
tests.
In analyzing these possibilities, we ﬁrst note that the term premia must be
time-varying for plim ˆ β  = 1 (i.e., the predicted value of β to be something
other than one). To show this, we report the probability limit of ˆ β in (3 ), which
is adopted from the derivation in Mankiw and Miron (1986):
plim ˆ β =
σ2[Et∆rt+1(3)] + 2ρσ[Et∆rt+1(3)]σ[φt(6,3)]
σ2[Et∆rt+1(3)] + 4σ2[φt(6,3)] + 4ρσ[Et∆rt+1(3)]σ[φt(6,3)]
, (4)
where σ2[Et∆rt+1(3)] is the variance of the expected change in the three-
month interest rate, ρ is the correlation between Et∆rt+1(3) and φt(6,3), and
σ2[φt(6,3)] is the variance of the term premium.3
Expression (4) is informative for our purposes. Notice that for nonstochas-
tic term premia, plim ˆ β = 1. Hence stochastic term premia are required for
plim ˆ β  = 1. Also observe that as σ2[φt(6,3)] increases, plim ˆ β decreases. Fur-
ther, note that plim ˆ β is a complicated function of σ2[Et∆rt+1(3)], but as this
term gets fairly large, plim ˆ β goes to one. More generally, ˆ β’s deviation from
a value of one will depend on the ratio of the variance of the term premium to
the variance of the expected change in interest rates.
It is this latter variance that Fed behavior may inﬂuence. In this regard,
Mankiw and Miron (1986) document the variation over time in this variable
and show that σ2[Et∆rt+1(3)] was much larger prior to the creation of the
Federal Reserve System. Mankiw and Miron attribute this ﬁnding to the Fed’s
concern for interest rate smoothing.
As Cook and Hahn (1990) point out, however, rate smoothing cannot be the
total story since the regression coefﬁcient on [rt(2)−rt(1)] is highly signiﬁcant
and close to one; moreover, for longer-term bonds the term structure does
help predict future changes in interest rates. Regarding the short end of the
yield curve, Cook and Hahn postulate that one must consider the discontinuous





















Campbell & Shiller coefﬁcient 0.5010 0.4460 0.4360 0.2370 0.1950 −0.1470
Table 2, T-bills, standard error 0.1190 0.1990 0.2380 0.1670 0.2810 0.2000
1952–87
Roberds, Runkle & coefﬁcient 0.5925 0.3935 na 0.2121 na −0.1411
Whiteman, Table 6 standard error 0.0983 0.1437 na 0.2822 na 0.6079
F Fund, 1984–91
Roberds, Runkle & coefﬁcient 0.7596 0.2953 na 0.1557 na −0.2971
Whiteman, Table 9 standard error 0.1359 0.1399 na 0.1861 na 0.3675
F Fund, 1984–91, SW*
Roberds, Runkle & coefﬁcient 0.7119 0.4104 na 0.0869 na −0.3149
Whiteman, Table 11 standard error 0.1720 0.1688 na 0.1878 na 0.4553
F Fund, 1984–91, FOMC†
* Settlement Wednesday.
† FOMC meeting date.
Note: Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman use daily data in their regressions.         
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and infrequent changes in policy. Therefore, economic information that will
affect future policy is often known prior to actual policy reactions. This factor
implies that movements in the short end of the term structure will anticipate
policy and hence have predictive content. In terms of equation (4), the variance
of ∆Etrt+1(1) is likely to be greater than the variance of ∆Etrt+1(3).
Additional arguments supporting the relevance of monetary policy for tests
of REHTS can be found in Goodfriend (1991) and McCallum (1994). McCal-
lum shows that if the Fed reacts to movements in the term structure, then the
strength of that reaction will inﬂuence estimates of β in tests of REHTS.
Taken together, these papers indicate that capturing Fed behavior is poten-
tially important for understanding the term structure. We now attempt such an
exercise.
2. A MODEL OF FED BEHAVIOR
Our model of Fed behavior is designed to capture the basic characteristics de-
scribed by Goodfriend’s (1991) analysis of Federal Reserve policy. In particular,
we model the Federal Reserve’s adjustment of its funds rate target as occurring
at intervals and only in relatively small steps. Also, funds rate changes are often
followed by changes in the same direction so that the Fed does not “whipsaw”
ﬁnancial markets. While the Fed is generally viewed as adjusting the funds
rate to achieve various economic goals, for our purposes it is sufﬁcient to let
the Fed’s best guess of an unconstrained optimal interest rate target follow an
exogenous process. For simplicity, let
∆r∗
t = ρ∆r∗
t−1 + ut, (5)
where r∗
t is the unconstrained optimal interest rate. That is, it is the interest
rate the Fed would choose before the arrival of new information if it were not
constrained to move the funds rate discretely. One could think of r∗
t as arising
from a reaction function, but equation (5), along with additional behavioral
constraints, is sufﬁcient for the purpose of our investigation. To capture Fed
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The behavior described by equation (6) implies that at each decision point
the Fed is guided by its overall macroeconomic goals as depicted by the         
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behavior of r∗
t . It adjusts its instrument r
f
t incrementally and discretely. Thus,
for a big positive shock to r∗
t , the Fed would be expected to raise the funds
rate at a number of decision points until r
f
t approximated r∗
t . There would also
be only a small probability that the Fed would ever reverse itself (i.e., raise the
funds rate one period and lower it the next).
We parameterize the variance of ut and the parameter ρ so that the behavior
of the funds rate target, r
f
t, is consistent with actual behavior over the period
1985:1 to 1993:12. The parameter ρ is set at 0.15, and ut has a variance of
0.09. In particular, ut is distributed uniformly on the interval [−0.525, 0.525].
A uniform distribution is used to facilitate the pricing of multiperiod bonds in
the next section.
The behavior generated by a typical draw from our stochastic process
and by the actual funds rate target are reasonably similar. These are depicted
in Figures 1 and 2. Table 2 provides some additional methods of comparison.

































The low p-values of Fisher’s exact test indicate that both actual and model data
are consistent with targeted interest rate changes not being independent of the
sign of previous changes.4 However, a somewhat smaller percentage of interest
rate changes are of the same sign in the model. The Fed, as modeled here, is
4 Model data are from 250 draws of a series with 300 observations.          
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Figure 2 Representative Draws of Funds Rate Target




















more likely to reverse itself than the Fed actually did over this period. Also,
the Fed of our model is more likely to leave the funds rate unchanged. Finally,
the correlation coefﬁcient between funds rate changes in the model is not sig-
niﬁcantly different from the actual correlation coefﬁcient displayed by the data.
We thus feel that equations (5) and (6) jointly represent a reasonable and
tractable model of Federal Reserve behavior, especially if r∗
t is thought of as
depending upon underlying economic behavior.
3. MONETARY POLICY AND THE TERM STRUCTURE
As described by equations (5) and (6), the Federal Reserve determines the be-
havior of the one-period nominal interest rate. The FOMC meets formally eight
times per year and informally via conference calls. Also, the chairman may act
between FOMC meetings so that in actuality the term of the one-period rate is
less than one month. Further, the timing between decision periods is stochastic
and can be as little as one week or as long as an intermeeting period.5 For
simplicity, we model the decision period as monthly. Thus, the pricing of a
5 For a more detailed modeling of behavior along these lines, see Rudebusch (1994).                
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Table 2 Actual and Model Data Comparison
Actual Model
Percent of Changes of Same Sign 0.833 0.648
Fisher’s Exact Text 2.6E-06 0.003600







Std(Etrt+1 − rt) 0.2409 0.1234
(standard error) (0.0034)
Std[Etrt+1(2) − rt] 0.2562 0.1457
(standard error) (0.0039)
Std[Etrt+1(3) − rt] 0.2687 0.1565
(standard error) (0.0040)
Std[Etrt+3(3) − rt(3)]∗ 0.1858 0.1306
(0.0052)
* Goldsmith-Nagan yields 0.2011.
Notes: Model data are from 250 draws of a series with 300 observations. The null of Fisher’s
exact test is that the sign of the change in the funds rate is independent of the sign of the previous
change.



















t ≤− 1/2]) + 2φt(2,1). (7)
In calculating the expectation of interest rates further than one period ahead,
say, for example, two periods ahead, one needs to form time t expectations of
terms such as Prob[r∗
t+2 − r
f
t+1 > 1/2]. Assuming that ut is uniformly distrib-




t+j−1. Thus, one can pass the expectations operator through the respective
cumulative distribution functions.
For pricing three-, four-, ﬁve-, and six-month term federal funds, we use
expressions analogous to equation (7). In order to examine the effect that our
model of monetary policy has on tests of the rational expectations hypothesis of
the term structure, we generate 250 simulations, each containing 300 values of
each rate. The results are presented in Table 3, where standard errors have been
corrected using the Newey-West (1987) procedure. We report results when               
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Table 3 Coefﬁcient Estimates Using Model-Generated Data
Independent
Variable r(2) − rr (3) − rr (4) − rr (5) − rr (6) − rr (4) − r(2) r(6) − r(3)
(a) σ(φ) = 0
Coefﬁcient 1.03 1.00 1.00 .99 .99 .97 .95
Standard Error (.005) (.118) (.109) (.158) (.179) (.22) (.42)
(b) σ(φ) = .10
Coefﬁcient .28 .49 .57 .62 .64 .35 .31
Standard Error (.055) (.084) (.105) (.122) (.138) (.083) (.114)
there is no term premium (row 1) and when there is a white-noise term premium
with standard deviation 0.10 (row 2).
The results indicate that in the absence of time-varying term premia, there
is no departure of estimates of β from one. This essentially serves as a check
on our calculations, since all interest rates are calculated using REHTS. With
a time-varying term premia, REHTS is rejected. However, the rejection of
the model’s data is not in keeping with the result on actual data. The es-
timates of β are increasing in k = n/m rather than decreasing. Also, the
results for k = 2 and m = one month, two months, and three months, respec-
tively, are almost identical for the model, while they are strikingly different
for the data. Looking at Table 2 and equation (4) shows why. Table 2 indi-
cates that σ2[Et∆rt+1(m)] is approximately the same for m = 1 and m = 3.
(When m = 2, its value is 0.151.) With σ2[φ(n,m)] equivalent by construction,
the estimate of β will not vary much across experiments. For a model with
white-noise term premia to replicate actual empirical results, it must generate
σ2(Et∆rt+1) >σ 2[Et∆rt+2(2)] >σ 2[Et∆rt+3(3)], which does not happen in
our particular model.
Interestingly enough, as shown in Table 2, the required behavior of
σ2[Etrt+1(m)−rt(1)] does not occur in the data either. We are therefore forced
to conclude that our description of monetary policy, along with white-noise
term premia, is insufﬁcient to explain the empirical results in Roberds, Runkle,
and Whiteman (1993) as well as in Campbell and Shiller (1991). Our failure
could be due primarily to an insufﬁcient model of policy or to an inadequate
model of term premia. In the next section we modify our model of term premia
and reexamine REHTS on data generated by our modiﬁed model.
4. A DESCRIPTION OF TERM PREMIA
To generate term premia that potentially resemble the stochastic processes of
actual term premia, we need some way of estimating term premia. For this we          
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turn to the multivariate ARCH-M methodology described in Bollerslev (1990).
We use a multivariate model since the term premia generated from a univariate
model are highly correlated. In essence, we estimate a multivariate ARCH-
M model of excess holding period yields then use the estimated process to
simulate time-varying term premia. The simulated processes, along with the
model in Section 2, are used to generate data on interest rates. This simulated
data is then used to estimate regressions like (3 ).
In estimating term premia (for the case in which k = 2), ﬁrst deﬁne the
excess holding period yield, yt(n,m), as
2rt(n) − rt+m(m) − rt(m).
From equation (1) we see that this is merely Etrt+m(m) − rt+m(m) + 2φt(n,m),
which is the sum of an expectational error and twice the actual term premium
as deﬁned in (1).
The multivariate ARCH-M speciﬁcation that we estimate over the sample
period 1983:1–1993:12 is given by
yt = β + δ loght + εt, (8)
where εt conditioned on past information is a normal random vector with
variance-covariance matrix Ht. The elements of Ht are given by
h2





hij,t = ρijhii,thjj,t, (9)
where yt is a 3 by 1 vector of the ex-post excess holding period yields on
Treasury bills that includes the two-month versus one-month bill, the three-
month versus one-month bill, and the six-month versus three-month bill.6 The
wi are ﬁxed weights given by (13−i)/78. In this speciﬁcation of the model, the
covariances hij are allowed to vary but the correlation coefﬁcients, ρij, between
the errors are constant. The coefﬁcient estimates are reported in Table 4. Almost
all the coefﬁcients are highly signiﬁcant.
The term premia derived from this model are depicted in Figure 3 and are
labeled T2, T3, and T6. Recall that T2 and T6 are twice φ(2,1) and φ(6,3),
respectively, while T3 is three times φ(3,1). One notices the term premia spike
upward in 1984, in late 1987, and in early 1991. The term premium on two-
month bonds also spikes in late 1988 and early 1989. The 1987 episode is
associated with the October stock market crash. Interestingly, the 1984 and
6 We use T-bills rather than term federal funds because coefﬁcient estimates using the federal
funds rate are insigniﬁcant. One possible explanation for this result is that the excess holding
period yield on federal funds involves both a term premia derived from a consumption-based
asset pricing model as well as default risk that may be uncorrelated with the term premia. This
default risk may add sufﬁcient noise that it is difﬁcult to estimate the term premia using ARCH-M
type regressions.          
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Table 4 Coefﬁcient Estimates for ARCH-M Model
Log likelihood = 149.72
Coefﬁcient Estimate Standard Error Signiﬁcance Level
β2 .98 .13 .0000
δ2 .46 .13 .0005
γ2 .058 .018 .0009
α2 .92 .20 .0000
β3 1.46 .13 .0000
δ3 1.25 .47 .0076
γ3 .52 .089 .0000
α3 .44 .13 .0010
β6 .94 .45 .0389
δ6 .79 .82 .331
γ6 .25 .08 .0011
α6 .23 .17 .0601
ρ23 .92 .016 .0000
ρ26 .48 .082 .0000
ρ36 .67 .060 .0000
1988–89 episodes correspond to the inﬂation-scare episodes documented in
Goodfriend (1993). The last spike in the term premia occurs around the time
of the Gulf War and a recession.
Statistical data for the in-sample residuals, the estimated term premia, and
the ex-post holding period yields are depicted in Table 5. In attempting to
ascertain the joint importance of Fed behavior and time-varying term premia
in explaining the regression results of Campbell and Shiller (1991) as well as
Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman (1993), we perform three experiments. First
we generate a funds rate that is stationary and thus does not display the interest
rate smoothing or discrete interest rate changes that are embodied in our model
of Fed behavior. Longer-term interest rates are then derived using equation (1)
and the rational expectations hypothesis. We do this to see if our model of term
premia by itself can account for the actual regression results. Next we examine
an interest rate process that includes a greater degree of smoothing but does
not require discrete changes in the funds rate. Finally, we combine our model
of term premia with our depiction of Fed behavior and investigate whether this
model of interest rate determination can explain the regression results obtained
using actual data. The results we analyze involve the cases in which n = 2,
m = 1, and n = 6, m = 3 (i.e., the term spread between the two-month and
one-month bills and the six-month and three-month bills).
To begin, we model the one-period interest rate as r∗
t = 0.75r∗
t−1 + ut.
As in our actual model of Fed behavior, ut is distributed uniformly on the
interval [−0.525, 0.525]. Combining this behavior with term premia generated
from our estimated ARCH-M model, we generate data on longer-term interest   
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Figure 3 Interest Rate Term Premia







































Notes: T2 is the term premium between the two-month and one-month bonds. T3 is the term
premium between the three-month and one-month bonds. T6 is the term premium between the
six-month and three-month bonds.            
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Table 5 Statistical Data from ARCH-M Model
Residuals Standard Error Correlation Matrix
ε2 .45 1.0
ε3 .99 .92 1.0
ε6 .64 .50 .70 1.0
Estimated Term Premia Mean Standard Error Correlation Matrix
T2 .60 .15 1.0
T3 1.35 .25 .90 1.0
T6 .53 .13 .77 .85 1.0
Actual Ex-post Yields Mean Standard Error Correlation Matrix
y2 .65 .47 1.0
y3 1.51 1.04 .93 1.0
y6 .62 .68 .55 .74 1.0
rates using equation (1). The regression results based on 500 simulations of
125 observations are
rt+1(1) − rt(1) = a0 + 0.43 [rt(2) − rt(1)] + ε1t,
(0.16)
rt+3(3) − rt(3) = α0 + 1.00 [rt(6) − rt(3)] + ε3t,
(0.18)
where standard errors are in parentheses. REHTS is not rejected by the second
regression, and the results of this regression are consistent with those docu-
mented in Mankiw and Miron (1986) and Choi and Wohar (1991) for the
period prior to the founding of the Fed. One must therefore conclude that our
model of term premia is not sufﬁcient for generating data that are capable of
replicating regression results using actual post-Fed data.
Next we model the short-term interest rates as ∆r∗
t = 0.15∆r∗
t−1+ut, which
is consistent with our modeling of r∗
t in equation (5). Thus, the only element
lacking from our complete model of Fed behavior is the discrete nature of funds
rate behavior given by equation (6). Generating data using this nonstationary
model of r∗
t , along with our model of term premia, we obtain the following
regression results:
rt+1(1) − rt(1) = b0 + 0.10 [rt(2) − rt(1)] + e1t,
(0.19)
rt+3(3) − rt(3) = β0 + 0.12 [rt(6) − rt(3)] + e3t.
(1.24)       
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Here both coefﬁcients are insigniﬁcantly different from zero. Thus, this experi-
ment does not generate the statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient commonly found
when using actual data on two- and one-month interest rates.
Finally, we combine the joint modeling of term premia using the ARCH-
M process and Fed behavior given by equations (5) and (6). These regression
results are the following:
rt+1(1) − rt(1) = c0 + 0.46 [rt(2) − rt(1)] + w1t,
(0.10)
rt+1(3) − rt(3) = γ0 + 0.64 [rt(6) − rt(3)] + w3t.
(0.59)
Here the joint modeling of term premia and Fed behavior is capable of
explaining a statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient that is less than one in the
shorter-maturity regression, whereas the coefﬁcient in the regression involv-
ing longer maturities is insigniﬁcantly different from zero. An explanation for
the increased signiﬁcance of the coefﬁcient in the ﬁrst regression from that
estimated in the previous experiment goes as follows. Due to Fed behavior, the
standard deviation of the expected change in the one-month rate has risen from
a value of 0.095 to 0.123, while the standard deviation of the term premia
has remained unchanged. However, there are only 35 episodes in which the
coefﬁcient in the ﬁrst regression is greater than 0.5 while the coefﬁcient in the
second regression is also less than zero. Thus, the coefﬁcient estimates that are
consistent with the results presented in Roberds, Runkle, and Whiteman (1993)
occur in approximately 7 percent of the trials.
The results presented above are not entirely satisfactory because the gen-
erated term premia do not exactly match the ﬁtted term premia of the model
(perhaps because the correlation coefﬁcients are constrained to be time in-
variant). The standard deviations of the generated term premia are somewhat
less than those depicted in Table 5, whereas the correlation coefﬁcients are
appreciably less. With generated data, σT2 = 0.17, σT3 = 0.14, and σT6 = 0.06
while ρ23 = 0.66, ρ26 = 0.20, and ρ36 = 0.41.
To remedy this situation, we generate data by also allowing the correlation
coefﬁcients, ρij, to vary intertemporally. We do this by allowing them to depend
on the hjj,ts in equation (9), producing standard deviations of σT2 = 0.14,
σT3 = 0.44, and σT6 = 0.12 and correlation coefﬁcients of ρ23 = 0.88,
ρ26 = 0.73, and ρ36 = 0.83. In a regression using data generated by this
mechanism, the coefﬁcient on the 2,1 term is 0.93(0.16) and on the 6,3 term
is 0.79(0.63), where standard errors are in parentheses. Also, in 10 percent
of the cases the 6,3 coefﬁcient is less than zero, while the 2,1 coefﬁcient is
greater than 0.5. When there is no discretization of movements in the funds
rate, these coefﬁcients are 0.54(0.47) and 0.11(1.95). Both coefﬁcients differ
insigniﬁcantly from zero.     
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While the term premia in the last simulation do not come from any esti-
mated model, the experiment at least shows that regression results that are in
accord with those obtained in practice can be generated by the combination
of (1) Fed behavior that both smooths the movements in interest rates and
only moves interest rates discretely and (2) time-varying term premia that are
calibrated to match data moments.
5. CONCLUSION
This article explores the linkage between Federal Reserve behavior and time-
varying term premia and analyzes what effect these two economic phenomena
have on tests of the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure.
Adding both these elements to a model of interest rate formation produces
simulated regression results that are reasonably close to those reported using
actual data. We thus feel that a deeper understanding of interest rate behavior
will be produced by jointly taking into account the behavior of the monetary
authority along with a more detailed understanding of what determines term
premia. Reconciling theory with empirical results probably does not require
abandonment of the rational expectations paradigm.
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